12+

Companies hit via stolen tokens

2

Platforms targeted (Snowflake, Salesforce)

3rd

Token theft campaign this week

0

Vulnerabilities exploited in Snowflake

WHAT HAPPENED

Last Friday, while parts of the world observed a bank holiday, ShinyHunters executed a coordinated data theft operation against over a dozen companies. The attack vector was not a vulnerability in any of the victim organizations' systems. It was a set of authentication tokens stolen from Anodot, an AI-driven analytics company that provides real-time anomaly detection for business and operational data. Anodot integrates directly with customer data environments, including Snowflake, Amazon S3, and Amazon Kinesis, using stored authentication tokens to pull data for analysis.

Anodot was acquired by analytics firm Glassbox in November 2025. Since Saturday morning, Anodot's status page has shown all of its connectors down across all geographic regions. BleepingComputer reported that multiple sources identified Anodot as the compromised integration partner, though Snowflake did not confirm the specific third-party by name. Neither Anodot nor Glassbox responded to press inquiries.

Snowflake confirmed detecting unusual activity affecting a small number of customer accounts tied to a specific third-party integration. The company stated that its own systems were not compromised, that affected accounts were locked down, and that customers were notified. Google's Threat Intelligence Group confirmed it is tracking the incident as part of a broader pattern of data theft campaigns targeting cloud services and enterprise integrations.

THE SHINYHUNTERS CONNECTION

ShinyHunters confirmed to BleepingComputer that they were behind the attacks. The group claimed to have stolen data from dozens of companies using Anodot's authentication tokens and hinted that they may have had access to Anodot's infrastructure for some time before executing the bulk exfiltration on Friday. They are now extorting victims with ransom demands to prevent data release.

This is not the first time ShinyHunters has targeted Snowflake customers. In 2024, the group ran a massive campaign using stolen credentials to access Snowflake environments that lacked multi-factor authentication. That operation hit AT&T, Ticketmaster, Santander, Neiman Marcus, and others. The current campaign is a tactical evolution. Instead of stealing individual credentials, they compromised a single integration provider and used its authorized access to reach multiple downstream targets simultaneously.

ShinyHunters also attempted to use the stolen tokens to access Salesforce environments but was blocked by automated AI detection before they could exfiltrate data. This tracks with a broader pattern we have been documenting. In our April 2 coverage of the Cisco breach, ShinyHunters was extorting Cisco with 300 stolen repositories, 3 million Salesforce records, and government data obtained through the TeamPCP supply chain. The group continues to operate at scale across multiple parallel campaigns.

ATTACK CHAIN

Figure 01

  1. 01
    Integration provider compromised. Attackers breach Anodot's infrastructure and obtain authentication tokens stored for customer integrations. These tokens provide direct access to customer Snowflake, S3, and Kinesis environments.
  2. 02
    Token-based access. Using stolen tokens, attackers authenticate directly into customer Snowflake accounts. No credentials to crack. No MFA to bypass. The tokens represent pre-authorized access that Anodot held legitimately.
  3. 03
    Holiday timing. Bulk data exfiltration executed on a Friday bank holiday when SOC staffing, incident response capacity, and executive availability are at their lowest. Maximum dwell time before detection.
  4. 04
    Cross-platform pivot. Attackers also attempted to use the tokens against Salesforce environments. This attempt was blocked by automated detection, suggesting Salesforce's monitoring caught the anomalous access pattern.
  5. 05
    Extortion. ShinyHunters contacts victims with ransom demands. Pay or the stolen data gets published. The same playbook they used against Snowflake customers in 2024 and Cisco in April 2026.

THE TOKEN THEFT PATTERN

This is the third distinct token theft campaign we have covered in four days. On Sunday, we analyzed the 37x surge in device code phishing, where eleven PhaaS kits sell the ability to trick users into completing MFA and handing over OAuth tokens through Microsoft's legitimate infrastructure. On Monday night, we covered APT28's FrostArmada campaign, where Russia hijacked 18,000 routers to intercept Microsoft Office tokens via DNS hijacking without deploying any malware.

Now we have a third vector: compromising a SaaS integration provider and stealing the tokens it holds for downstream customer access. Three completely different technical approaches. Three different threat actors (criminal PhaaS operators, Russian military intelligence, ShinyHunters). All converging on the same target: authentication tokens that grant access to enterprise cloud environments.

The pattern is now undeniable. Passwords are not the primary target anymore. Tokens are. And they are being harvested from every layer of the stack. From the user's browser through phishing. From the network path through DNS hijacking. From the integration layer through third-party compromise. If your security model is built around protecting passwords and enforcing MFA, you are defending against the last war. The current war is about token security, and most organizations do not even have visibility into where their tokens are stored, who holds them, or how long they live.

INCIDENT DETAILS

BREACH DETAILS

  • Compromised entity //

    Anodot (acquired by Glassbox, Nov 2025)
  • Attack vector //

    Stolen authentication tokens from SaaS integration infrastructure
  • Primary target //

    Snowflake customer accounts (12+ confirmed)
  • Secondary target //

    Salesforce (attempted, blocked by AI detection)
  • Threat actor //

    ShinyHunters (self-confirmed to BleepingComputer)
  • Execution date //

    Friday, April 4 (bank holiday in multiple countries)
  • Anodot status //

    All connectors down across all regions since Saturday AM
  • Snowflake response //

    Affected accounts locked, customers notified, investigation ongoing
  • Google TIG //

    Confirmed tracking as part of broader cloud data theft campaign pattern
  • Known Anodot customers //

    Puma, SAP, T-Mobile, UPS (impact unconfirmed for these specific companies)

DEFENSE TAKEAWAYS

  1. 1

    Inventory every third-party integration that holds authentication tokens or credentials for your cloud environments. This includes analytics platforms, monitoring tools, data pipelines, and any SaaS product that connects to your Snowflake, S3, BigQuery, or Salesforce instances. Most organizations cannot produce this list on demand.

  2. 2

    Implement token rotation policies for all third-party integrations. Long-lived tokens stored by integration partners are exactly the asset that was stolen here. If your tokens never expire and never rotate, a single breach at any integration partner gives attackers permanent access until someone notices.

  3. 3

    Monitor for anomalous access patterns in your cloud data environments, especially during holidays and weekends. ShinyHunters deliberately timed this operation for a bank holiday. If your monitoring coverage drops when staffing drops, attackers know that and exploit it.

  4. 4

    Apply the principle of least privilege to integration tokens. Does your analytics vendor need read access to every table in your Snowflake environment? Or does it only need access to the specific datasets it monitors? Scope the blast radius before the breach, not after.

  5. 5

    If you use Anodot or any Glassbox analytics product that connects to your data infrastructure, rotate all associated credentials and tokens immediately. Review access logs for the past 30 days. Do not wait for Anodot or Glassbox to provide a timeline. They have not responded to press inquiries.