6
Federal agencies on the advisory
3,000+
Rockwell PLCs exposed online
3
CI sectors confirmed hit
5
OT ports being scanned
WHAT HAPPENED
On April 7, six federal agencies published joint advisory AA26-097A, warning that Iranian-affiliated APT actors have been targeting internet-exposed PLCs across U.S. critical infrastructure since at least March 2026. The advisory was co-authored by the FBI, CISA, NSA, EPA, Department of Energy, and U.S. Cyber Command's Cyber National Mission Force. That is the largest coalition of agencies to sign a single OT advisory in recent memory. The breadth of the signatory list tells you how seriously the federal government is treating this.
The confirmed targets are Rockwell Automation and Allen-Bradley manufactured PLCs deployed in three sectors: Government Services and Facilities, Water and Wastewater Systems, and Energy. The advisory specifically names CompactLogix and Micro850 PLC devices as targets. CNN reported that multiple U.S. oil, gas, and water sites have been disrupted in recent weeks. The FBI confirmed that this activity has resulted in both operational disruption and financial loss at multiple organizations.
The attackers are not using zero-days. They are exploiting an authentication bypass vulnerability (CVE-2021-22681) that was disclosed in 2021. Five years later, devices running this vulnerability are still exposed to the public internet. Nozomi Networks' field CISO Markus Mueller told Cybersecurity Dive that more than 3,000 Rockwell devices remain visible online, either because organizations do not know they are exposed or because they underestimate the risk.
HOW THE ATTACK WORKS
The attackers used leased, overseas-hosted infrastructure and Rockwell Automation's own Studio 5000 Logix Designer software to establish accepted connections to victim PLCs. This is the legitimate configuration tool that operators use to program and manage these controllers. The attackers connected the same way an authorized engineer would, using the authentication bypass to skip the credential check.
Once connected, the FBI identified two primary activities. First, the attackers extracted the device's project file, which contains the complete logic that controls the physical process the PLC manages. Whether that is water treatment chemical dosing, power distribution switching, or facility environmental controls, the project file is the blueprint for everything the controller does. Second, the attackers manipulated data on HMI and SCADA displays, which are the operator interfaces that show staff what the physical systems are doing. When an attacker controls what operators see on their screens, they control the operator's understanding of reality.
The advisory also notes inbound scanning on ports 44818, 2222, 102, 22, and 502. Port 102 is associated with the Siemens S7 protocol and port 502 with Modbus. The inclusion of these ports means the same actors may be targeting devices from other OT vendors beyond Rockwell. The attackers also deployed Dropbear, a lightweight SSH server, on victim endpoints for persistent remote access through port 22.
ATTACK CHAIN
Figure 01
- 01Internet scanning. Attackers scan for internet-exposed Rockwell PLCs on port 44818. Additional scanning on ports 2222, 102 (Siemens S7), 22 (SSH), and 502 (Modbus) indicates targeting of multiple OT vendor platforms.
- 02Authentication bypass. Attackers exploit CVE-2021-22681 to connect to victim PLCs using Rockwell's Studio 5000 Logix Designer without valid credentials. The connection appears legitimate to the device.
- 03Project file extraction. Attackers download the PLC's project file, which contains the complete control logic for the physical process. This provides full understanding of what the device controls and how.
- 04Display manipulation. Attackers modify data shown on HMI and SCADA displays. Operators see incorrect readings for the physical processes they are monitoring. The gap between display and reality is where operational damage occurs.
- 05Persistent access. Dropbear SSH deployed on victim endpoints for ongoing remote access via port 22. Attackers maintain the ability to return and interact with compromised OT environments.
THIS IS AN ESCALATION
This is not the first time Iranian actors have targeted U.S. water systems. In November 2023, CyberAv3ngers, an IRGC-affiliated group, compromised at least 75 Unitronics PLC devices, including the Municipal Water Authority of Aliquippa in western Pennsylvania. That campaign used default passwords on Israeli-manufactured Unitronics controllers.
The current campaign is broader in scope, more technically capable, and hitting a wider set of sectors. Check Point Research confirmed that identical targeting patterns appeared against Israeli PLCs in March 2026 before the U.S. advisory was issued, indicating a coordinated multi-front operation. The escalation tracks with a broader shift in Iranian cyber activity following the U.S.-Israeli military strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities and military infrastructure on February 28, 2026.
The timing also creates a policy collision that we documented yesterday on this blog. The White House has proposed cutting CISA's budget by $707 million and eliminating the stakeholder engagement offices that coordinate with water districts and local government operators. The SafeState analysis noted that approximately 60% of CISA's workforce was furloughed beginning February 14, reducing the agency's capacity at the precise moment Iranian cyber activity intensified. The organizations this advisory is trying to reach are the same organizations that are losing their primary point of federal support.
ADVISORY DETAILS AND IOCS
ADVISORY DETAILS
-
Advisory //
AA26-097A (published April 7, 2026) -
Authoring agencies //
FBI, CISA, NSA, EPA, DOE, USCYBERCOM CNMF -
Threat actor //
Iranian-affiliated APT (specific group name not attributed in advisory) -
Active since //
At least March 2026 -
Sectors hit //
Government Services/Facilities, Water/Wastewater, Energy -
Targeted devices //
Rockwell CompactLogix, Micro850 PLCs -
Key CVE //
CVE-2021-22681 (authentication bypass in Logix controllers, disclosed 2021) -
Tools used //
Studio 5000 Logix Designer (legitimate), Dropbear SSH -
Impact //
Operational disruption and financial loss confirmed at multiple orgs
TARGETED PORTS
-
44818 //
Rockwell Automation EtherNet/IP -
2222 //
Rockwell alternate communication -
102 //
Siemens S7 protocol (indicates broader OT vendor targeting) -
22 //
SSH (Dropbear deployment for persistence) -
502 //
Modbus (industrial protocol, widely used across OT environments)
DEFENSE TAKEAWAYS
- 1
Take PLCs off the internet. Today. If a Rockwell CompactLogix or Micro850 is accessible from the public internet in your environment, it is in the targeting scope of an active Iranian APT campaign right now. There is no legitimate operational requirement that justifies direct internet exposure for these devices.
- 2
Review Rockwell's advisory PN1550 for CVE-2021-22681 and apply the recommended mitigations. This vulnerability has been known for five years. If your controllers are still running without the fix, the window of assumed compromise extends back to whenever they were first exposed.
- 3
Scan your logs for traffic on ports 44818, 2222, 102, 22, and 502 originating from overseas hosting providers. The advisory includes specific IP addresses and timeframes. Cross-reference them against your network logs immediately.
- 4
Verify the integrity of your PLC project files. If an attacker has extracted your project file, they understand your control logic completely. If they have modified it, your physical process may not be doing what your HMI says it is doing. Independent verification of physical process state against display readings is critical.
- 5
Check for Dropbear SSH on OT endpoints. This is not software that belongs in an industrial control environment. Its presence on any device connected to your OT network is a confirmed indicator of compromise.